JK Fowler

“The most effective propaganda is that which is prepared in the guerilla zone.”[1]

“The military is still adapting to operating in an increasingly interconnected and integrated global media environment, where anyone armed with a hundred dollar digital camera and access to the internet can become an ‘information warrior’”.[2]

“How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading communications society?”[3]

Whether Hezbollah in the Israeli-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006, Hamas in the Battle of Jenin in 2002, or the ongoing expansion of the “insurgency” across the internet, new media has opened up traditional warfare to that of the virtual and information (and the management and control thereof) has become absolutely paramount for those engaged in new media warfare. Stated succinctly, new media are the tools of the guerrilla information warfare of the 21^st century. Often the discussion around new media and its effects are relegated to civil society or business but there is an arena of interest often overlooked: warfare. While broadly we may think of new media as, “that combustible mix of 24/7 cable news, call-in radio and television programs, internet bloggers and online websites, cell phones and iPods,”[4] perhaps a more timeless definition is that which is offered by Dennis M. Murphy, a Professor of Information Operations and Information in Warfare at the U.S. Army War College: “Any capability that empowers a broad range of actors (individuals through nation states) to create and disseminate near-real time or real time information with the ability to affect a broad (regional or worldwide) audience using global standardized communications technologies such as the internet as unifying platforms.”[5] With such definitions in mind, this paper will attempt to accomplish three things: firstly, it will outline the ways in which the U.S. military has begun utilizing social media to put a more human face on its divisions as well as open up communications between soldiers, families, and friends. Secondly, it will outline how the military has come to perceive new media as a weapon to be used in, as British military expert John McKinley dubs it, the “virtual arena of war”, and information operations as essential to winning the “war of ideas” which the Global War on Terrorism has become.[6] Lastly, this paper shall explore the ways in which the “insurgencies” have begun utilizing new media to fight the lumbering bureaucracies of Western powers, pulling primarily on the cases of the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006, the Battle of Jenin in 2002, as well as the ever-expanding presence of the “insurgency” across the web. This paper will conclude by stating that while the U.S. military is attempting to adapt to the guerilla warfare of the new media “insurgencies”, its long-standing culture of rigid hierarchies and vertical lines of power structures will have to speedily give way to the horizontal fluidity of its aggressors or it will find itself quickly defeated and madly outpaced in the “war of ideas”.

The presence of the U.S. military in social media outlets has expanded rapidly in just this year and it is worth briefly outlining how far the Department of Defense, US Army and US Air Force have gone in just a short time.[7] As of April 16^th, 2009, the U.S. Army launched its own Facebook page, currently followed by 111,617 fans[8]. The US Air Force has garnered a presence on Facebook that currently has close to 51,000 fans and the Department of Defense (DOD) also has a Facebook page, currently with a mere 1,309 fans. However, in addition to their organizational Facebook pages, each have allowed for, and in many cases encouraged, individuals in the military to create pages and link to the overall organization’s page. This has resulted in the DOD having over 70 Facebook pages linked to it, 30 for the US Air Force, and 86 for the US Army. The DOD’s social media coverage does not stop there though. In addition to Facebook, one can find the DOD presence on Blog Talk Radio (2 channels), Blogs (the DOD Live blog plus links to 44 other blogs), Delicious (4 links), Flickr (the DOD Flickr page plus 25 other links including one to Space, Missile and Defense Command), iReport (2 links), Linkedin (2 links), MySpace (6 links), NowPublic (1 link), Twitter (the DOD Twitter site plus 68 other links), Vimeo (3 links), and YouTube (the DOD YouTube page plus 40 other links).[9] The story for the US Air Force and Army are not much different. The US Air Force boasts of over 12 YouTube links in addition to Air Force Blue Tube (the official YouTube site of the US Air Force), 36 Twitter links in addition to the official US Air Force Twitter page, an official page on Flickr as well as an official blog called Air Force Live.[10] The US Army has 76 Flickr sites in addition to its official site at soldiersmediacenter, 78 Twitter sites in addition to its official site at USArmy and over 40 YouTube sites in addition to its official site at soldiersmediacenter.[11] Add to these the fact that each department has its own webpage with multimedia interactivity (the US Army site even has a link to a video game called America’s Army 3[12]) as well as the fact that the Pentagon has recently released a new website called the Pentagon Channel which features live, streaming video feeds from inside the Pentagon as well as links to the Pentagon Channel on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and iTunes and a partial, yet staggering, picture of the US military presence in social media forums arises. With such widespread coverage, what guidelines are in place to protect information sensitive to the U.S. military and its operations and service members and what are the purposes of such a presence?

As of December 19^th, 2009, there is no official social-networking policy for the Department of Defense and all of its affiliates. Although DOD officials have stated that a, “review weighing the benefits and risks of using social-networking technology was expected to be released months ago,”[13] no such policy has yet to be released and it is not expected to be released any time soon. While this may seem extremely troubling to those fearful of breaches of security, individual divisions such as the US Army, Air Force and Navy have issued brief social-networking policies internally to their members. As of early 2009, the Air Force Public Affairs Agency Emerging Technology Division released a 23-page document entitled, New Media and the Air Force which amongst other things arduously outlines guidance and guidelines with respect to the differing forms of new media usage. While stating that, “the Air Force views personal websites and blogs positively, and it respects the rights of Airmen to use them as a medium of expression,” it quickly follows by stating that all Airmen, “are on duty 24-hours a day, 365-days a year and all actions are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).”[14] While underlining the appreciation the Air Force has for self-expression it states that all Airmen must still represent the core values of the Air Force, even on the web: “integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all that is done.”[15] This paradox arises across the DOD when it comes to guidance and guidelines of new media usage and the DOD’s unease with the huge cultural shift that new media is inducing from a traditional, vertical communication hierarchy to a more horizontal, atomized and fluid form is abundantly apparent. The reasons for instituting such a change are many, however, and are akin to many of the challenges traditional hierarchical media outlets are facing today.

As Jim Stanton in his article entitled, “The New Media and the US Military” states, “From the front lines of Iraq, where Army Gen. Ray Odierno posts daily updates to his Facebook page, to Fort Huachucha in Sierra Vista, AZ, which posts video greetings to deployed troops, America’s military is infiltrating the world of online social networking.”[16] But why? One perhaps obvious benefit is the leverage it gives friends and families to converse with the deployed soldiers overseas and hear their stories of day-to-day life. As Bonnie Sanders, a mother of two whose husband was deployed, states, “It felt good knowing that he would know we were thinking of him.”[17] Major Samuel House, a public affairs officer for the National Guard, kept track of his three boys when he was in Afghanistan with Skype[18]: “It’s really important…being able to see your children and have your children see you on the other side. It makes everything much easier.”[19] Such social networking sites put a human face on the Army, Air Force, and DOD that people might not otherwise see. At MILBlogging.com[20], a site boasting of over 2,500 military blogs in 43 countries with 8,236 registered members, visitors are given a snapshot of the top miliblogs as well as links to all others aggregated by country.[21] On the right hand side, constantly updated tweets from the miliblogging account at Twitter are featured where family and friends can communicate in real time with friends and relatives based overseas. But as Defense Deputy Chief Information Officer Dave Wennergren states, “We need to look at this as internet-based capabilities rather than just social networking. This is more than just for ‘quality of life’ [for deployed soldiers]. These tools are for a broader use than people realize.”[22] As Wennergren outlines, the successful modernization of federal operations in the digital age hinges on six key points: a) sharing information relentlessly and securely; b) keeping up with technical advances; c) changing the existing model for information sharing; d) recognizing that the future has happened and making full use of the technologies; e) behaving like an enterprise; and f) doing everything possible to be transparent.[23] Such points offer insight into the fact that the military has strategically engaged new media to maintain a presence in the information domain with the goal of horizontally informing the media, the public and each other. But behind such a strategic engagement is a very specific way in which the military has come to perceive new media as a weapon to be used in the virtual arena of war, the war of ideas, or the information battle space. As the last sentence of the introduction to New Media and the Air Force states, “If the Air Force does not tell its story, someone else will.”[24]

“Strategy should be based on the premise that the Department of Defense will fight the net as it would an enemy weapons system.”[25]

The proliferation of information through multiple sources (computers, cell phones, cameras, radios, et al) has, after some trepidation, been fully recognized by the US military as a problem of control and management but also one of great opportunity. The war is now fought on multiple fronts, one of which is the information front. As the Joint Doctrine of Information Operations states, “Information is an instrument of national power and has complex components with no single center of control. Information itself is a strategic resource vital to national security and allows communicators to shape the information battlefield.”[26] Information, it is recognized, has long been an obsession of any nation’s military waging (or thinking of waging) war and to point out this quote is not to presume that something is new about using information for national power. It is, however, to point out that from the Cold War to today, something has changed with regards to how information is viewed and the speed by which it is transmitted and consumed. The technology is smaller, faster, and cheaper and the, “ability to control and verify information is much more limited than in the recent past.”[27] As Dennis M. Murphy states, “The current information environment has leveled the playing field for not only nation states, but non-state actors, multinational corporations and even individuals to affect strategic outcomes with minimal information infrastructure and little capital expenditure.”[28] Recognizing the bureaucratic and legal constraints so endemic to the military, much of the literature being produced by the military or those associated with it has within it a deep unease and recognition that cultural change is absolutely necessary to compete in the ever-changing landscape of information production and consumption. Such recognition is met with resistance from senior war fighters who, “certainly understand its [new media’s] importance but lack the cultural upbringing to see it in the context of current military operations.”[29] Murphy refers to this as the generation gap between “digital immigrants” and “digital natives” and underlines the importance of closing the gap as quickly as possible to manage the information environment most effectively.[30]

In a piece entitled, “Blogs and Military Information Strategy”, James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning examine how blogging may be incorporated into military information strategy primarily as a tool for influence operations, a subset of information operations (IO). In their concluding remarks, they stress the need for military use of the blogosphere to focus on foreign blogs, bloggers and audiences and emphasize that it will require a truly integrated inter-agency approach on a national level.[31] Key then, to how the military views information and new media capabilities, is the concept of “Information Operations” (IO). Stated succinctly, information operations involve, “actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems…IO capitalizes on the growing sophistication, connectivity, and reliance on information technology.”[32] Quoting such people as Sun Tzu, Mikhail Frunze, Herodotus, and Niccolo Machiavelli and offering images such as the “Increasing Access to Information” figure[33], the “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations” reads eerily like documents similar to the 90-page Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare manual written for the Nicaraguan Contras in 1984 by the CIA. Stated in April of 1992 in the “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress”, “…the effective use of information operations by the Coalition to defend against Saddam’s information strategy ensured that Iraq was not only beaten, but also failed to ever seize the initiative.”[34] A key primary goal of the focus on information operations is to not only offensively utilize them as they did in the Persian Gulf War but to defensively use them by knocking down walls between intelligence agencies and increasing the ease of access to information for agents attempting to counter terrorist threats and gather intelligence on the “enemy”.

In early 1994 the CIA created Intelink that allowed any agency to publish a web page or put a document or a database online, secure from the outside world. But as Clive Thompson of The New York Times reports, the volume of material became too massive when paired with shoddy search engines far inferior to publicly available search engines like Google.[35] Over 10 years later in 2005, based largely off of Wikipedia, two members from the office of the director of national intelligence, Thomas Fingar and Mike Wertheimer, joined with CIA wiki experts to build Intellipedia, “a wiki that any intelligence employee with classified clearance could read and contribute to.”[36] By August of 2009, 3,600 members of the intelligence services had contributed a total of 28,000 pages.[37] Once the nine different intelligence agencies saw the benefit of utilizing the new media tool of the wiki, the DOD began training its analysts in the use of blog software and wikis. New media was the new buzzword and was going to be an important tool in fighting “adversaries.” But, as Clay Shirky states, “For the intelligence agencies to benefit from ‘social’ software, they need[ed] to persuade thousands of employees to begin blogging and creating wikis all at once. And that requires a cultural sea change: persuading analysts, who for years have survived by holding their cards tightly to their chests, to begin openly sharing their hands online.”[38] The military, then, faces a real dilemma: on the one hand, many of the agencies within the military have survived by secrecy; on the other, suddenly the military finds itself fighting against an enemy lacking the hierarchical bureaucracies, red tape, and vertical power structures and needs to openly share information to compete. This is a dilemma the military has yet to find a solution to. The “enemy,” however, has no such dilemma.

On November 6^th, 2008, it was revealed by the Financial Times that on multiple occasions, Chinese hackers have penetrated the White House computer network and obtained emails from government officials.[39] This is in addition to the large amount of information which was downloaded from the McCain and Obama campaigns by Chinese hackers in the summer of 2008 as well as the 2007 breach of the Pentagon where Chinese hackers breached the same system Robert Gates, the defense secretary at the time, was on.[40] On December 17^th, 2009 it was revealed that Iraq insurgents hacked US drones for under $26.00 using off the shelf software programs such as SkyGrabber and downloaded live video feeds from the Predator drones prowling the skies of Iraq.[41] In addition, US troops are continually faced with ever-improving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, improving because militants are able to use modern telecommunications networks to exchange info on how to improve them.[42] And as recent as December 19^th, 2009, a group calling themselves the Iranian Cyber Army hacked into the social network Twitter and diverted anyone trying to visit the site to a page which stated, “USA think [sic] they are controlling and managing internet by their access, but they don’t, we control and manage internet by our power.”[43] Such events speak to the ever-diversifying forms of power new media is allotting to non-state actors with political and social agendas, actors many of whom the US military would deem “enemy combatants.”

In Lebanon for 34 days in the summer of 2006, an asymmetrical war erupted between Israel (a state) and Hezbollah (a “state within a state”), a group which has been characterized as a, “militant, secretive, religiously fundamentalist sect or faction.”[44] And unlike any other war before[45], this war was “live”, networks projecting in real time the grim reality of advancing or retreating Israeli troops in southern Lebanon including the destroyed homes and villages, Israeli airplanes attacking Beirut airport, and Hezbollah rockets striking northern Israel and Haifa.[46] To do this, journalists utilized the camera and the computer. As Kalb and Saivetz state, “The camera and the computer have become weapons of war.”[47] New technology makes real-time coverage feasible[48]. The images had a powerful influence on public opinion and Hezbollah, a largely closed society, was able to greatly exploit the media through projecting a, “narrative that depicted a selfless movement touched by God and blessed by a religious fervor and determination to resist the enemy and achieve a ‘divine victory’”.[49] Hezbollah, like Hamas and al-Qaeda, utilized the information battlefield to control its image and sway world public opinion against Israel who, as a more “open” society, had to deal with leaked Israeli secrets, rumors and widespread misinformation. As Steve Fondacaro states, “A revolution happened without us knowing or paying attention. Perception truly now is reality and our enemies know it.”[50] After 2006, it became increasingly acceptable for journalists to be activist players in the field providing dramatic and at times, incendiary, coverage simply to garner ratings in the 24/7 cable news barrage of information. As Edward S. Herman states, “they [the media] serve mainly as a supportive arm of the state and dominant elites, focusing heavily on themes serviceable to them, and debating and exposing within accepted frames of reference.”[51] UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) had been stationed on the Lebanese border since 1976 and during the 2006 war, published information regularly on its official website about Israeli troop movements in an effort to be “impartial and objective.”[52] Because of Hezbollah’s closed nature, no information was posted about their movements and although it is unknown as to whether or not Hezbollah utilized the easily-accessible information, with a computer and internet connection they very well could have. An asymmetric guerilla information war was waged and Hezbollah won, utilizing favorable coverage from news networks such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, tightly controlling images and information (rarely was a Hezbollah guerilla shown), creating pro-Hezbollah blogs which fought for public opinion with pro-Israeli blogs and swaying hungry new media-driven, 24/7 journalists looking for a story by inviting them into the closed Hezbollah society only to feed them a well-scripted story of resistance against the Israelis. As Ivan Segal[53] recently stated in a talk given at The New School in New York City, the, “media no longer has a functional relationship to conflict; it doesn’t report on conflict anymore, it’s actually a part of it.”[54]

In the case of the Battle of Jenin in 2002, Israel attempted to root out Hamas terrorists in the West Bank of the Palestinian occupied territories, banning all media from entering the city. Due to this restriction, the information battle space was abrogated to the militants.[55] Photos quickly leaked out of homes being demolished by Israeli bulldozers and cell phones allowed for phone interviews with Jenin residents. Jenin quickly became a symbol of Israeli ruthlessness against Palestinians.[56] As Murphy states, “The lesson of Jenin is that the military may be able to dominate the information environment in a localized geographical area for a limited period of time but these wildcards, utilizing new media capabilities, become that limiting factor.”[57] The role of cell phones in movements cannot be understated. Whether it is Afghanistan or Somalia, Pakistan or Jordan, states across the globe are quickly adopting digital media. “Mobile is pervasive in the third world. 97% of Tanzanians have access to mobile phones. Mobile coverage exists throughout Uganda. There are 100 million handsets in Sub-Saharan Africa…59% of mobile phones are in the developing world—over seven million mobile subscribers in Kenya alone.”[58] Cell phones in Kenya can be used as credit cards, farmers in China can receive crop market prices from the Chinese government via text messaging, and as the recent political unrest in Iran shows, cell phones can be strategically used and exploited for great political gains.[59] As Ivan Segal points out, Pakistan (a country where 60% of the population is under 25) has roughly 100 million cell phone users quickly obtaining access to 3G networks, a boom in satellite television (50 satellite television stations, 10 of which are 24-hour news channels), and increased internet usage and radio coverage. Such statistics point to the fact that more and more people across the globe are obtaining access to real-time information.

The last case worth exploring of “enemy” combatants utilizing new media is that of the “insurgent” movement whereby the internet is used to post, “influential information items which include extremist training materials, an ideological rationale for actions, instructional manuals plus propaganda and agitation materials.”[60] Through the use of the internet and cell phones, “insurgents” are able to respond to unfolding events before coalition forces have a chance or opportunity to because of their, “lengthy chain of command approval process that takes hours or days to grant approval.”[61] Iraqi al-Qaeda leader Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi often used the internet to speak about US casualties, the Iraqi elections, Israel and other issues. Similarly, the Mujahideen Army posted a video entitled “The Sniper of al-Fallujah.” Thomas, in his piece on “Cyber Mobilization”, points to both of these examples as moments when ideological or religious fence-sitters adopt “extremist” causes.[62] The nature of war has changed. By initiating a physical action such as the detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) in Iraq and Afghanistan and then immediately cyber responding by cell phone, internet or some other device, the message will reach a wide audience quickly and can offer such non-state individual’s or groups influence and support in their movement. US Army Col. Rob Baker offers an example of when a suicide bomber’s belt was detonated too early in Iraq and accidentally killed a number of innocent Iraqis.[63] Insurgents immediately utilized cyber devices to state that the US had launched a missile strike on the population and within minutes, an anti-American crowd had gathered.

It is worth briefly mentioning too the insurgent’s utilization of jihadi websites which, “enable insurgents to discuss their tradecraft and to exchange justifications for actions, both accomplished and planned.”[64] Websites have allowed for targeting information to be spread (for example, embassy and living quarters of US and British sites in Kuwait and Qatar) and can also serve as intelligence and reconnaissance assets to extremists, Al-Mohagar al-Islami (“The Islamic Immigrant”) recently publishing a 40-page pamphlet on the art of kidnapping online. In 2006, the Al-Rashedeen Army posted an open letter to President Bush on the internet, suggesting he think over the fact that, “God is on our side and always will be.”[65] In these ways, “insurgents” are attempting to shape and influence local and global popular opinion much like the US military is in Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem is that the war has changed to a “molecular civil war,” one where the insurgents quickly adapt, move fluidly due to moveable and readily-available technologies and antiquated, fossilized bureaucracies cannot fare well in the virtual battle space of the 21^st century.

New media has greatly altered the landscape of warfare. Reminiscent of the guerilla warfare tactics outlined in Ernesto Che Guevara’s Guerilla Warfare and those actions practiced by the Vietcong in Vietnam, today’s “insurgents” have taken to their cell phones, their computers, and their cameras to thwart the US military in the increasingly important “war of ideas”. And while clearly the US military recognizes this, the question remains: can a traditionally hierarchical bureaucracy such as the US military adapt quickly enough to meet the fluid and ever-adapting nature of the insurgency in the information battlefield? In an organization that once prized itself on control of private information, can the DOD now adapt to the new information landscape offered by new media, one that has democratized the means to create, disseminate and consume information and made public much of the information that they once cherished as private?[66] The US military is today quickly outpaced by an increasingly complex, technologically-adept “enemy.” To catch up, the US military must institute an overhaul of its culture and ways of thinking about the world and while they may have made steps in the right direction, the rest of the world has made leaps and bounds.

[Click on links to see image files in appendixes]

Appendix 1

[67]

[68]

[69]

[70]

Appendix 2

[71]

Appendix 3

[72]

[73]

Appendix 4

[74]

[75]

[76]

[77]

[78]

[79]

[80]

[2] Collings, Deirdre and Rafal Rohozinski. “Shifting Fire: Information Effects in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations”. U.S. Army War College. 2006. December 21^st, 2009, i.x. http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/ShiftingFireMenu.pdf.

[3] Zaharna, R.S. “American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World: A Strategic Communication Analysis”. American University. 2001. December 21^st, 2009.  http://www.fpif.org/pdf/reports/communication.pdf.

[4] Kalb, Marvin and Carol Saivetz. “The Israel-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict”. U.S.-Islamic World Forum. 2007. December 21^st, 2009.  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/0217islamic%20world/2007islamforum_israel%20hezb%20war.pdf.

[5] Murphy, Dennis M. “New Media and the Warfighter: Workshop Initial Impressions”. Center for Strategic Leadership. Vol. 3 No. 8 (2008), 2.

[6] Collings and Rohozinski, 9.

[7] For some fascinating visuals on the state of new media across the world, please see Appendix 4.

[8] All statistics in this section are as of December 20th, 2009.

[9] http://www.defense.gov/Registeredsites/socialmediasites.aspx

[10] http://www.af.mil/socialmedia.asp

[11] http://www.army.mil/media/socialmedia

[12] See Appendix 1

[13] Corrin, Amber. “DOD Social-Media Policy Still in Limbo”. December 1^st, 2009. December 21^st, 2009. http://www.fcw.com/Articles/2009/12/01/DOD-social-media-policy-Wennergren-comments.aspx

[14] Air Force Public Affairs Agency Emerging Technology Division. “New Media and the Air Force”. 2009. December 21^st, 2009, 7 http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090406-036.pdf.

[15] Ibid., 7.

[16] Stanton, Jim. “The New Media and the U.S. Military”. Web 2.0 Convergence. May 11^th, 2009. December 21^st, 2009. http://www.digitalcommunitiesblogs.com/web_20_convergence/2009/05/the-new-media-and-the-us-milit.php.

[17] Ibid.

[18] http://www.skype.com/

[19] Gray, Kristy. “Technology Allows Guard Members, Families to Stay Connected”. Trib.com. November 28^th, 2009. December 21^st, 2009. http://www.trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_ef56add0-0940-5239-b019-ae3284c63e21.html.

[20] See Appendix 1

[21] Miliblogs by country: U.S. (1,747), Iraq (441), Afghanistan (90), Germany (46), Canada (25), U.K. (24), Kuwait (13), South Korea (13), et al.

[22] Corrin, Amber.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Air Force Public Affairs Agency Emerging Technology Division, 1.

[25] Brookes, Adam. “US Plans to ‘Fight the Net’ Revealed”. BBC. January 27^th, 2006. December 21^st, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4655196.stm

[26] Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13”. October 1998. December, 21^st, 2009, 1. www.c4i.org/jp3_13.pdf

[27] Murphy, Dennis M. “Fighting Back: New Media and Military Operations”. U.S. Army War College. 2008. December 21^st, 2009, 4. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Fighting%20Back%20(Murphy).pdf

[28] Ibid., 5.

[29] Ibid., 14.

[30] Ibid., 15.

[31] Denning, Dorothy and James Kinniburgh. “Blogs and Military Information Strategy.” Joint Special Operations University. 2006. December 21^st, 2009. www.au.af.mil/info-ops/jsou/blogbook06june.pdf.

[32] Joint Chiefs of Staff, vii.

[33] See Appendix 2

[34] Joint Chiefs of Staff, vii.

[35] Thompson, Clive. “Open-Source Spying.” The New York Times. December 3^rd, 2006. December 21^st, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03/magazine/03intelligence.html

[36] Ibid. Also please see Appendix 3.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Sevastopulo, Demetri. “Chinese Hack Into White House Network”. Financial Times. November 6^th, 2008. December 21^st, 2009. http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto110620081938360726&page=2

[40] Ibid.

[41] Gorman, Siobhan, Yochi J. Dreazen and August Cole. “Insurgents Hack US Drones”. Wall Street Journal. December 17^th, 2009. December 21^st, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126102247889095011.html.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Stafford, Patrick. “Twitter Hacked by Iranian Protestors”. Smart Company. December 21^st, 2009. December 21^st, 2009. http://www.smartcompany.com.au/internet/20091221-twitter-hacked-by-iranian-protestors.html.

[44] Kalb, Marvin and Carol Saivetz, 3.

[45] Depending on what literature one reads, the Persian Gulf War is sometimes considered the first “live” war. For the purposes of this paper and in the viewpoint of Kalb and Saivetz and others, the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006 was the first “live” war.

[46] Kalb, Marvin and Carol Saivetz, 4.

[47] Ibid., 4.

[48] Seib, Philip. “Politics of the Fourth Estate: The Interplay of Media and Politics in Foreign Policy”. Harvard International Review. Fall (2000), 62.

[49] Kalb, Marvin and Carol Saivetz , 5.

[50] Packer, George. “Knowing the Enemy”. The New Yorker. December 18^th, 2006. December 21^st, 2009. 65-66. http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2

[51] Herman, Edward S. “The Media’s Role in U.S. Foreign Policy”. Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), 25.

[52] Kalb, Marvin and Carol Saivetz, 14.

[53] Executive Director of Global Voices http://www.globalvoices.org/.

[54] Segal, Ivan. “Digital Media in Conflict-Prone Societies”. New York City: The New School, November 12^th, 2009.

[55] Murphy, Dennis M. “Fighting Back: New Media and Military Operations”, 10.

[56] Ibid., 10.

[57] Ibid., 10.

[58] Ibid., 7.

[59] One must also think of the WTO protests in December of 1999 in Seattle WA.

[60] Thomas, Timothy L. “Cyber Mobilization: A Growing Counterinsurgency Campaign”. ISphere. 2006. December 21^st, 2009, 1.  www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_thomas.pdf.

[61] Ibid., 1.

[62] Ibid., 2.

[63] Crawley, Jeff. “Proponent Hosts Info Ops Gathering”. The Lamp. December 22^nd, 2005. December 21^st, 2009. ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/ist/docs/fet/strat-1.pdf.

[64] Thomas, Timothy L., 3.

[65] “Al-Rashedeen Army Presents”. Site Institute. March 26^th, 2005. December 21^st, 2009. http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications160306&category=publicationsandsubcategory_0

[66] Armstrong, Matt. “New Media and Persuasion, Mobilization and Facilitation”. Mountainrunner.us. August 5^th, 2008. December 21^st, 2009.

[67] http://www.americasarmy.com/

[68] iTunes Pentagon Channel page

[69] http://www.pentagonchannel.mil/

[70] http://www.milblogging.com/

[71] All figures in appendix 2 are taken from the Joint Doctrine for Information Operations 3-13 which can be found here: www.c4i.org/jp3_13.pdf

[72] This pops up every time one visits the intellipedia login screen. https://www.intelink.gov/wiki

[73] https://www.intelink.gov/wiki

[74] http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/2009/more-truth-about-twitter/

[75] http://www.vincos.it/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/wmsn-12-09.png

[76] http://informationarchitects.jp/web-trend-map-4-final-beta/

[77] http://www.flickr.com/photos/eyecube/3302969531/sizes/m/

[78] http://www.flickr.com/photos/metrobest/3485574749/sizes/o/in/set-72157617478192160/

[79] http://theconversationprism.com/1024/

[80] http://www.newscientist.com/data/images/ns/cms/mg20227062.200/mg20227062.200-6_1000.jpg